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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, 
a joint venture, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WESLEY SINE d/b/a COTTONWOOD 
BOWLING LANES, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
COTTONWOOD BOWLING LANES, INC., 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case Nos. 19861 
19839 
ANSWER OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
iv 
INTRODUCTION 
Attached as an appendix to this Answer is a copy of the 
decision rendered by this Court on November 17, 1988. The facts 
relevant to this appeal are accurately and succinctly summarized 
on pages 1 and 2 of Justice Howe's opinion. 
ACTION SOUGHT BY COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY 
1. Respondent and Cross-Appellant Cottonwood Mall 
Company requests that the Petition for Rehearing be denied and 
that the action be remanded to the District Court to fix the 




THE DECISION RENDERED HEREIN CORRECTLY 
APPLIES THE RELEVANT CASE LAW. 
Appellant Wesley F. Sine argues in his Petition for 
Rehearing that the facts in the instant action are distinguishable 
from the facts of Pingree v. The Continental Group of Utah/ Inc., 
558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). Appellant argues that Pingree 
concerned agreements to renew by negotiation, while the instant 
case concerns an alleged agreement to renew at a future date on 
reasonable terms and conditions. 
Initially, it should be realized that the point raised is 
a distinction without a difference. The law presumes that in 
negotiating business transactions parties will act reasonably, 
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given their differing perspectives and objectives. From the point 
of view of legal analysis the statement of a person that he will 
negotiate regarding a proposed arrangement is the equivalent of 
the statement that a party is willing to be reasonable regarding a 
proposed arrangement. Neither statement is sufficient to 
establish a contract within the framework of existing law. 
The Appellant has certainly not offered any legal support 
whatsoever for his assertion that these two statements result in 
different legal consequences. 
The elements of the Pingree case are discussed in detail 
in the briefs filed herein, and on pages 4 through 6 of the 
decision authored by Justice Howe. 
Pingree is not a complex decision. The case unequivocally 
adopts the majority rule, as set forth in Slayter v. Pasley, 199 
Or. 616, 264 P.2d 444 (1953) that a provision for the extension 
or renewal of a lease must specify the time the lease is to extend 
and the rate of rent to be paid with such a degree of certainty 
and definiteness that nothing is left to future determination. If 
the provision falls short of this requirement, it is not 
enforceable. 
One would be hard put to state the rule in plainer 
language. The contention that Pingree did not delineate the rule 
to be applied in Utah (Petition for Rehearing, page 5) is 
without merit. The Appellant's inquiry into the legal history of 
the minority rules unmentioned in Pingree is wholly irrelevant in 
view of the opinion's adoption of the majority rule. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED AND DECIDED THE 
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL. 
In Point II of the Petition for Rehearing, Appellant 
repeats his attempts to distinguish Pingree. However, the 
emphasis here is on the alleged agreement of Mr, Holman to renew 
the lease on "reasonable terms". The Appellant baldly 
misrepresents Finding of Fact No. 15 (r.1201) to which the Court's 
attention is directed. 
Appellant cites Finding of Fact No. 15 for the assertion 
that: 
"The trial court found, as a matter of fact, 
that S.M. Horman had agreed to renew the lease 
agreement, upon 'reasonable terms'". (Petition 
for Rehearing, pg. 7). 
Finding of Fact No. 15 actually reads: 
"15. S.M. Horman again assured the real estate 
agents of Wesley F. Sine and S.M. Horman would 
renew the lease agreement upon reasonable terms 
and conditions at the expiration of the current 
lease ." 
Horman sold the property in question before the original 
lease expired. This finding was drafted by the Appellant. The 
energy which the Appellant has used in searching for a way to 
distinguish Pingree could have been better expended in eliminating 
the discrepancies between the assertions set forth in his Petition 
and the actual Findings of Fact as adopted by the trial court. 
POINT III 
THE OPINION CORRECTLY APPLIES THE RELEVANT CASE 
LAW. 
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None of the cases referred to in Point III of the Petition 
for Rehearing are on point. Cummings v. Rytting, 116 Utah 1, 207 
P.2d 804, 805 (1949), Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376 
P.2d 548 (1962), and Ferris v« Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) 
were all referred to in the Appellant's original Brief on Appeal, 
and were found not applicable in the decision rendered herein. 
The remaining cases referred to, in addition to applying 
to obviously different fact situations, were published prior to 
the filing of the briefs in this case. 
POINT IV 
THE CLAIM THAT THE DECISION RENDERED HEREIN 
WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON NUMEROUS LEASE 
AGREEMENTS IN UTAH IS IRRELEVANT; IS RAISED 
HERE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THIS ACTION; AND IS 
TOTALLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
No evidence was presented at the trial court level 
concerning the contents or language of lease agreements beyond the 
specific lease agreement with which this case is concerned. The 
pleadings of the Appellant nowhere assert any claim on behalf of 
other persons or entities which might be affected by the Court's 
decision in this matter. Neither the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law or Judgment apply to anyone beyond the 
litigants to this case. The briefs and supporting pleadings filed 
by the Appellant as part of the appeal process make no mention of 
the interests of the public at large. 
Under these circumstances, this assertion provides no 
support for granting the Appellant's Petition for Rehearing. 
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POINT V 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
ITS REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
The trial court denied Cottonwood Mall Company's request 
for attorney's fees on the grounds that Cottonwood Mall Company 
had terminated the holdover tenancy of the defendants• (Record. 
1211/ Finding of Fact 54). That decision was erroneous in view of 
the express language of the written lease agreement of May 4, 
1961, the relevant part of which reads as follows: 
If, during the term of this lease, lessor is 
required to commence any action to commence any 
of the rental due under this lease, or to 
enforce any of the provisions herein, or to 
secure possession of the lease premises in the 
event this lease is terminated as herein 
provided, or at the expiration of the term, 
lessee agrees, in such event or events, to pay 
all costs of such action or actions, together 
with reasonable attorney's fees, (plaintiff's 
exhibit no. 1, paragraph 33, R. 79). (emphasis 
supplied). 
After September 14, 1981, defendants became holdover 
tenants, subject to the terms of the original lease. (R. 1211, 
Finding of Fact 52). Defendants had failed to produce any 
evidence which might rebut such a finding by the court. 
Thereafter, Cottonwood Mall Company terminated the 
holdover tenancy. (R. 1211, Finding of Fact 53). This action was 
then initiated to recover possession of the premises. (R. 2). 
Under the language of the lease cited above, the lessor is 
entitled to recover attorney's fees when it is forced to commence 
civil action to recover possession of the lease premises after the 
lease is terminated at the expiration of the term. That is the 
exact situation present in the instant action, and under the 
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language of the lease, Cottonwood Mall Company was entitled to 
recover the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in bringing this 
action* 
The landlord is entitled to the benefit of his bargain as 
set forth in the lease agreement. In order to give reasonable 
effect to the lease language, Cottonwood Mall Company must be 
awarded its attorney's fees and costs which it has incurred in 
recovering the leasehold premises. 
The case cited by Petitioner, Lincoln Financial Corp. v. 
Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102 (Utah 1977) is inapplicable to this factual 
situation. 
The Lincoln case was an unlawful detainer action which 
arose when defendant failed to vacate her apartment after the 
terminaton of her lease. In the present case, the lease had 
expired and defendants became a holder tenant on a month-to-month 
basis seeking to renew their lease. A holdover tenant is presumed 
to be bound by the covenants which were binding during the fixed 
term. One of those covenants way to pay the costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in an action to secure possession of the leased 
premises. Ms. Ferrier was found to be in unlawful detainer after 
cancellation of her lease and therefore was not bound by a lease 
provision requiring her to pay attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant Cottonwood Mall Company 
respectfully requests that the Petition for Rehearing be denied, 
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and that this matter be remanded to the trial court to fix costs 
and attorney's fees as per the decision rendered herein. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
DATED this ^ Q day of )/^\AL^LU^ , 1989. 
GREEN & BERRY 
RAYMOND SCOTT BERJ 
Attorney for Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant 
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Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for 
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Cottonwood Mall Co., a joint venture, 
brought this action to recover possession of space in the 
Cottonwood Mall occupied by defendant Wesley F. Sine and 
intervenor Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., a corporation 
of which Sine is the president. Defendant and intervenor 
No. 19861 
F I L E D 
November 17, 1988 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
(hereinafter defendant or Sine) counterclaimed to enforce an 
alleged oral agreement to renew the expired lease under which 
the space was held. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, 
defendant appeals. Plaintiff cross-appeals from the denial 
of an award of attorney fees incurred in recovering 
possession of the space. 
On May 4, I961f Sidney M. Horman, as lessor, and 
S. W. Pugsley, as lessee, entered into a twenty-year lease of 
space in the Cottonwood Mall, a shopping center in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, to be used for bowling lanes. In 1979, Sine 
was contemplating the purchase of the outstanding stock of 
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., a corporation controlled by 
Pugsley's son which operated the bowling lanes. Sine caused 
his real estate agents to approach Horman and inquire as to 
his willingness to renew the lease which was due to expire on 
September 14, 1981. On at least two occasions, Horman advised 
the agents that he would be willing to renew the lease on 
reasonable terms, but that he would not sign a new agreement 
until closer to the time the lease expired. Allegedly based 
on these representations, Sine purchased the outstanding 
stock of the Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., for $338,000, 
took an assignment of the lease, and began to operate the 
bowling lanes. 
Prior to expending money for improvements on his 
newly acquired space, Sine again requested his agents to 
inquire of Horman regarding renewal of the lease. Horman 
allegedly assured the agents that he would renew the lease on 
reasonable terms at or about the time the present lease would 
expire. Sine contends that he spent $10,000 to $20,000 to 
improve and remodel the leased space, based on the additional 
representation by Horman and his reputation for being a man 
of his word. Herman's interest in the lease was thereafter 
assigned to plaintiff. 
Prior to the expiration of the lease, plaintiff 
notified defendant that the lease would expire by its terms 
on September 14, 1981, and that defendant would become a 
tenant on a month-to-month basis as provided for in the 
lease. In October of 1981, plaintiff increased the monthly 
rental substantially and shortly thereafter notified defen-
dant that the month-to-month tenancy was terminated and the 
premises should be vacated by November 30, 1981. Defendant 
did not vacate by that date, as the parties were involved in 
negotiating a new lease. When those efforts failed, plaintiff 
brought this action to recover possession and its attorney 
fees thereby incurred. Defendant counterclaimed, seeking to 
enforce Horman's oral promise to renew upon reasonable terms. 
Before trial, defendant vacated and moved to other premises. 
The trial court denied defendant any relief on its counter-
claim and awarded judgment to plaintiff for the reasonable 
rental value of the leased space during the time that 
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defendant occupied it after the expiration of the written 
lease. Plaintiff, however, was refused any attorney fees. 
Defendant appeals, and plaintiff cross-appeals from the 
judgment. 
I 
In its answer to plaintiff's complaint, defendant 
asserted the defense of lack of standing of plaintiff, a 
joint venture, to sue in the name of the joint venture, 
without joining the individual members of the joint venture 
as indispensable parties plaintiff. It argued that the 
individual members are the "real party in interest" under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). The trial court denied 
a pretrial motion to dismiss the complaint based on this 
defense. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3.1 (1981, Supp. 1987) 
defines a "joint venture" as "an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners of a single business enter-
prise" and provides that the property and transfer rights of 
joint ventures shall be governed by the same statutes as 
general partnerships. Sections 48-1-1 through -40 contain 
Utah's adaptation of the Uniform Partnership Act. Its 
provisions are silent on whether a partnership may sue in its 
own name. Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states that a partnership may be sued in its common name, but 
whether the partnership may sue is not specified. We noted 
in Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984), that whether 
a partnership is empowered to sue in the partnership's name 
has not been decided in this state. Earlier in Wall 
Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, Inc., 593 P.2d 
542 (Utah 1979), we held that a limited partnership is a 
statutory creation and, having characteristics somewhat 
similar to corporations, could sue in the courts of this 
state in its own name without identifying its partners or 
making them plaintiffs. We noted in that case that the 
common law rule that partners were required to join as 
plaintiffs in actions to enforce partnership rights has been 
criticized as a "useless relic of strict procedural rules 
with nothing, apparently, to justify its continued existence" 
and that the modern tendency is to depart from it. 
Recently, in Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil Products, 
114 F.R.D. 69 (D. Utah 1987), Judge Winder analyzed the issue 
under Utah law and concluded that a joint venture can bring 
suit in its common name without the necessity of naming the 
joint venturers as plaintiffs. Noting our criticism in Wall 
Investment Co. of the common law rule and the tendency of 
courts to depart from it, Judge Winder opined that this Court 
would, when faced squarely with the issue, hold that joint 
venturers may sue in the name of the joint venture. In that 
decision, he also relied upon a recent opinion, Decker Coal 
Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 714 P.2d 155, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1227 (Mont. 1986), which came to that same conclusion after 
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an analysis of Montana statutes and rules of procedure. The 
court there noted that there was no statute or rule of proce-
dure in Montana granting partnerships or joint ventures the 
right to sue in their own names. Montana Rule of Civil 
procedure 17(b) states that the capacity of persons to sue 
and be sued should be determined by appropriate statutory 
provisions. The court therefore looked to provisions of the 
Uniform Partnership Act, which has been adopted in Montana. 
Section 8 of the Act (our section 48-1-5) provides that 
partnerships may own property. Section 9(e) (our section 
48-1-6(3)(e)) speaks of partnership "claim[s]." Another 
Montana statute allows partnerships to be sued in their own 
names. Finally, the court noted that partnerships are 
authorized to file small claims actions. In commenting on 
the effect of the foregoing statutes, the court stated: 
[T]his Court has little choice but to 
follow the clear intent of the Montana 
Legislature to treat partnerships as 
distinct entities with power to sue. It 
would be illogical and unfair to conclude 
that a partnership may own a claim but 
cannot enforce it; may own property but 
cannot protect it; may be sued but cannot 
sue; may sue in small claims court but not 
in Federal Court. The Montana Legislature 
should not be deemed to have acted so 
capriciously. 
Decker Coal Co., 714 P.2d at 157. To the list of examples 
given by the Montana court where the Uniform Partnership Act 
treats a partnership as an entity, we add section 13 of the 
Act (which is our section 48-1-10), making the partnership 
entity liable for the negligence of one of the partners while 
acting within the ordinary course of the business of the part-
nership. See Wayne-Oakland Bank v. Adams' Rib, 48 Mich. App. 
144, 210 N.W.2d 121 (1973) (where a partnership was held 
liable for a partner's negligence even though the partner had 
immunity under the law by reason of his parental relation to 
the injured party). 
We agree with the analysis and reasoning of Judge 
Winder in Gary Energy Corp. and with the Montana Supreme 
Court in Decker Coal Co. and hold that the trial court 
properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss. 
II 
Defendant contends that the expressed affirmations 
and promises of Horman and defendant's reliance thereon either 
renewed the written lease or, in the alternative, entitled 
defendant to a renewal of the lease upon "reasonable terms." 
In that event, "reasonable terms" would be based on the 
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written lease, the only issues to be determined being the 
amount of rent and the term of the renewed lease. This 
contention is fully answered by Pingree v. Continental Group 
of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). There, the lease 
granted the lessee the option to renew the lease for two 
separate additional five-year terms upon the same terms and 
conditions of the original lease, except 
that the rental amount will be renegoti-
ated; however, maximum total monthly 
rental shall not exceed $900 per month. 
Factors of tax increase, costs of 
business increases or decreases, business 
volume and success, insurance costs and 
other reasonable allowances, will be the 
basis for terms of negotiation. 
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1320. 
The lessee gave timely notice of his exercise of the 
option to renew. The lessors responded that the new rental 
would be $900 per month, basing their demand on the increase 
in taxes and insurance and what they considered to be a fair 
return on their investment in the leased premises. The 
lessee replied and proposed $500-per-month rent based on his 
increased costs of doing business and a decrease in his 
volume. When the parties were unable to agree on the rent 
for the renewal period, the lessor brought an action to 
recover possession. The lessee counterclaimed for enforce-
ment of a five-year renewal at $500 per month. The trial 
court found that the parties had impliedly agreed on a 
reasonable rental figure which the court determined and fixed 
at $900 per month. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial 
court, stating that it had nullified the express factors 
specified by the parties in the lease and had substituted a 
new agreement to which the parties had not committed them-
selves. We held that the option to renew was too vague and 
indefinite to be enforceable and that the lease terminated at 
the end of the original term. We cited with approval and 
relied on Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 
428 (1961), where we stated, "[A] condition precedent to the 
enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting of the 
minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either 
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be 
enforced." In so ruling, this Court followed what was termed 
the majority rule in Slayter v. Pasley, 199 Or. 616, 264 P.2d 
444 (1953), which was stated to be 
that a provision for the extension or 
renewal of a lease must specify the time 
the lease is to extend and the rate of 
rent to be paid with such a degree of 
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certainty and definiteness that nothing is 
left to future determination. If it falls 
short of this requirement, it is not 
enforceable. 
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1321. In reversing the trial court, 
this Court expressly rejected its attempt to fix a reasonable 
rent for the parties when their negotiations bogged down. 
Defendant would have us now do what we refused to do 
in Pingree. While it is true that defendant adduced evidence 
as to what would be a reasonable renewal term and what would 
be a reasonable rent, the trial court properly spurned defen-
dant's invitation to find or make an agreement where the 
parties had themselves failed. Defendant argues that in 
Pingree, the court declined to fix the renewal rent because 
of the difficulty in balancing the several factors which the 
lease required the parties to consider in fixing the rent. 
Here, defendant's argument continues, no factors are listed 
in the lease and the task is less complicated. We do not 
agree. In determining what is "reasonable rent," many 
factors must be weighed and put into the equation. Easiness 
judgments must be made. Horman testified that he would not 
negotiate a new lease at the time Sine's real estate agents 
approached him because of inflation and instability in the 
commerical leasing market. He was unwilling to enter into 
another lease, either long term or short term, unless he 
could consider the costs of operating and owning the building 
as they compared to the amount of rent received. He only 
indicated that he would be willing to enter into a new lease 
at a reasonable figure and at the appropriate time. After he 
sold his interest in the leased property to plaintiff, plain-
tiff and defendant were unable to agree on the amount of 
rent. Courts simply are not equipped to make monetary deci-
sions impacted by the fluctuating commercial world and are 
even less prepared to impose paternalistic agreements on 
litigants. We therefore conclude that the written lease 
terminated by its own terms at its expiration date, was not 
renewed by the parties, and cannot be renewed for them by the 
courts. 
Ill 
Turning now to plaintiff's cross-appeal, namely, 
that the trial court erred in denying it attorney fees, plain-
tiff's claim for fee was premised on the following provision 
in the 1961 written lease: 
If, during the terms of this lease, lessor 
is required to commence any action to 
collect any of the rental due under this 
lease, or to enforce any of the provisions 
herein, or to secure possession of the 
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leased premises in the event this lease is 
terminated as herein provided, or at the 
expiration of the term, lessee agrees, in 
such event or events, to pay all costs of 
such action or actions, together with 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
The trial court denied fees "for the reason that the lease 
agreement upon which plaintiff makes claim for attorney's 
fees expired by its terms, and the plaintiff terminated the 
lease agreement and treated the lease agreement as though it 
had expired and been terminated . . . ." 
We do not agree with that conclusion. It is true 
that the 1961 written lease was for a twenty-year term that 
expired on September 14, 1981; however, paragraph 36 of that 
lease provided: "Any holdover beyond the termination of this 
lease, and any acceptance of rental beyond the term of this 
lease shall be deemed to have established a month-to-month 
tenancy as between lessor and lessee." Nothing is there 
stated, however, regarding whether the provisions and 
conditions of the written lease are binding on the parties 
during the month-to-month tenancy. It is a firmly estab-
lished rule that proof of a holding over after the expiration 
of a fixed term in a lease gives rise to the presumption, 
which in the absence of contrary evidence will be control-
ling, that the holdover tenant continues to be bound by the 
covenants which were binding upon him during the fixed term. 
Annotation, Binding Effect on Tenant Holding Over of 
Covenants in Expired Lease, 49 A.L.R.2d 480 (1956). It is 
further pointed out there that this rule obtains even though 
certain of the provisions in the expired lease are changed, 
such as, for example, the provision as to the amount of rent 
to be paid. 
Applying those rules to the instant case, when 
the twenty-year term of the 1961 written lease expired on 
September 14, 1981, defendant held over on a month-to-month 
basis and continued to be bound by the provisions and condi-
tions of the written lease during that holdover period. The 
fact that on October 12, 1981, plaintiff notified defendant 
that the monthly rental was being increased from $2,150 per 
month to $4,500 per month did not affect the binding force of 
the other provisions of the written lease. On October 23, 
1981, plaintiff advised defendant that it had elected to 
"nullify" the month-to-month tenancy and requested that 
defendant vacate the premises by November 30, 1981. Since 
there was no evidence by either party that the provisions and 
conditions of the written lease were modified during the 
month-to-month tenancy, except for the increase in the amount 
of rent, the provision in the 1961 lease regarding attorney 
fees remained binding on the parties until the month-to-month 
tenancy expired on November 30, 1981. At that time, defendant 
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had the duty to vacate, and when it failed to do so, the 
provision for the payment of attorney fees became operative. 
As will be noted, that provision specifically covers actions 
by the lessor to secure possession of the premises at the 
expiration of the lessee's term, which under the rule stated 
above includes the holdover period. Consequently, the trial 
court erred in denying any award of attorney fees to 
plaintiff. 
The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded 
to the trial court to determine and fix the amount of attor-
ney fees and trial and appeal costs to which plaintiff is 
entitled under paragraph 33 of the written lease. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
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